Support for nalbuphine reversal of opioids: quantitative considerations
To the Editor: The recent report by Blaise, Nugent, McMichan and Durant in your journal concluded against the use of nalbuphine after 50-75 ~g. kg-t fentanyl had been given during anaesthesia for abdominal aortic surgery. ~ My impression of this use of nalbuphine is that it is employed to reverse narcosis and respiratory depression in a dose of 0.05 mg'kg -I to0.3 mg'kg -~ Latasch, Probst and Dudziak considered, in patients who had received 7 p,g" kg -I fentanyl for induction of anaesthesia and a further 200 p,g every 15 min, that the narcosis would be reversed with 20 mg nalbuphine. 2 In that dose nalbuphine displaces fentanyl from mu opioid receptors to facilitate breathing and a concomitant lessening of mu antinociception. Kappa receptor moderated analgesia may be obtained with larger doses of nalbuphine (e.g., multiples of the 20 mg dose). Since nalbuphine is a potent anaesthetic, 3 smaller doses, if sufficient, should be acceptable in the recovery room.
When opioids are used in large doses for major surgery, "large" doses of nalbuphine reversal seem to be warranted. By increasing the dose nalbuphine in proportion to the dose of opioid patients can be made comfortable, normotensive, eucapnic and normoxic and the catheter can be extubated after major surgery. 
Jehovah's Witness
To the Editor: in his recent letter I Dr. W. H. Noble disagrees with the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in the case of Malette vs Shulman. The basis for his concern was the acceptance by the Court as valid, a signed but undated and unwitnessed, pre-printed wallet card indicating that the patient, who is a Jehovah's Witness, did not wish to receive blood or blood products under any circumstances. Although the patient was unconscious at the time the physician decided to administer blood transfusions, the patient's daughter arrived at the hospital during the course of treatment and requested that the transfusions be stopped. This request was denied.
Noble's proposed solution, for which he seeks a legislated basis, is that advance directives of this type should be be declared acceptable if dated ("within a reasonable period -perhaps one year") and signed by a witness.
As the following personal experience clearly demonstrated, conformance with these exact requirements will not always provide assurance that the patient has understood the full implications of his/her directive. I was surprised to be made aware, just before the start of scheduled surgery, of a witnessed, dated (day of surgery) and signed "Refusal of Blood Transfusion" form (official hospital form) in the medical record of a patient ! had seen the evening before. At that time, she had not mentioned any concern about receiving blood or blood products. Fortunately the presence of this new form in the patient's record was brought to my attention before induction of general anaesthesia, allowing me the opportunity to discover that the basis for the "refusal" was that she simply "did not like the idea of receiving someone else's blood." The patient was in fact quite prepared to receive blood or blood products, if required as part of her medical treatment. She was appalled to learn that one implication of her signing the form was the interpretation that she was prepared to die rather than to receive a blood product.
The case of Malette vs Shulman continues to be the subject of general interest 2-5 and is seen as precedentsetting, with Canada-wide implications, despite the fact that it arose from the Appeal Court of one Province. The primary area of precedent in this case is the right of self-determination, including the right of a competent individual to refuse treatment which in the opinion of others is likely to be beneficial, or essential, even if death may result as a consequence of this refusal. The issue concerning the form of the advance directive, in this case, the undated, unwitnessed wallet card, although of secondary importance, also has major implications, as outlined by Noble. A third important point, which has received less emphasis in the subsequent discussion of the judgement was the specific refusal by the Court to accept the notion of"informed refusal." This element of the decision has troubling implications and appears to be in conflict with the principles of the well-established doctrine of "informed consent."
The issues of advance directives for health care (living wills) and durable powers of attorney (binding arrangements for future substitute consent) are under active review in several provinces, including Manitoba. 6 I am sure that as part of these current discussions, concerns such as those expressed by Noble will be dealt with in new laws or regulations. In the meantime, we are left with both the need and the responsibility to make individual judgements on the validity and relativity of advance directives of the type subject to litigation in Malette vs Shulman, and to accept the consequences of our decisions. 
